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Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction
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Abstract
We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately ef-
ficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek’s classic point of view
that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized
planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite
matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we prove that
non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than do interactive
ones, even ones that only use a modest amount of interaction.
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1 Introduction
The most basic economic question in a social system is arguably how to determine an efficient
allocation of the economy’s resources. This challenge was named the economic calculation problem
by von Mises, who argued that markets do a better job than centralized systems can. In his classic
paper [17], Hayek claimed that the heart of the matter is the distributed nature of “input”, i.e. that
the central planner does not have the information regarding the costs and utilities of the different
parties:
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated
or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of ... knowledge which all the separate
individuals possess.
Hayek therefore proposes that the question of which economic system is better (market-based
or centrally-planned) hinges on which of them is able to better transfer the information needed for
economic efficiency:
which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends ... on whether we are more
likely to succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge
which ... is initially dispersed among many different individuals, or in conveying to the
individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their
plans with those of others.
When Hurwicz [20] formalized a notion of protocols for transfer of information in an economy,
the basic examples were a Walrasian-Tatonnement protocol modeling a free market and a command
process that entails full report of information to a centralized planner. He noted that:
The language of the command process is much larger than that of the Walrasian process.
We must remember, however, that the pure command process is finished after only two
exchanges of information while the tatonnement may go on for a long time.
This paper follows Hurwicz’s approach of formalizing Hayek’s question by technically studying
the amount of information exchange needed for obtaining economic efficiency. We consider the
main distinction – in terms of information transfer – between a centralized system and a distributed
market-based one to be that of interaction: in a centralized system all individuals send information
to the central planner who must then determine an efficient allocation, while market based systems
are by nature interactive.1
Our main results support Hayek’s point of view. We exhibit situations where interaction allows
exponential savings in information transfer, making the economic calculation problem tractable for
interactive markets even when it is intractable for a centralized planner. We have two conceptually
similar, but technically disjoint, sets of results along this line. The first set of results considers the
classic simple setting of unit-demand bidders, essentially a model of matching in bipartite graphs.
The second and more complicated setting concerns combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders.
In both settings we show that non-interactive protocols have exponentially larger communication
1 Interactive versions of centralized planning such as the “market socialism” models of Lange and Lerner [25] have
also been suggested. These can essentially simulate free markets so become indistinguishable from market mechanisms
in terms of their informational abilities. The distinction between them and true market models is, thus, outside the
scope of the discussion in this paper. It should perhaps also be noted here that from a more modern point of view,
the revelation principle states that centralized systems can also simulate any incentives that a distributed one may
have.
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costs relative to interactive ones. In a complementary set of results we also show that exponential
savings in communication costs can be realized with even limited interaction.
In technical terms, we formalize this problem in the realm of communication complexity.2 Non-
interactive systems are modeled as simultaneous communication protocols, where all agents simul-
taneously send messages to a central planner who must decide on the allocation based on these
messages alone. Interactive systems may use multiple rounds of communication and we measure
the amount of interactiveness of a system by the number of communication rounds. In both of
our settings we prove lower bounds on the simultaneous communication complexity of finding an
approximately efficient allocation as well as exponentially smaller upper bounds for protocols that
use a modest number of rounds of interaction.
We now elaborate in more details on the two settings that we consider and describe our results.
We begin with the technically simpler setting of bipartite matching.
1.1 Bipartite Matching
In this simple matching scenario there are n players and n goods. Each player i is interested in
acquiring a single item from some privately known subset Si of the goods and our goal is to allocate
the items to the players in a way that maximizes the number of players who get an item from their
desired set. This is of course a classic problem in economics (matching among unit demand bidders)
as well as in computer science (bipartite matching).
We first consider simultaneous protocols. Each of the players is allowed to send a small amount
of information, l bits with l << n, to the centralized planner who must then output a matching.
Theorem:
• Every deterministic simultaneous protocol where each player sends at most nǫ bits of com-
munication cannot approximate the size of the maximum matching to within a factor better
than O(n1−ǫ).
• Any randomized simultaneous protocol where each player sends at most nǫ bits of communi-
cation cannot approximate the size of the maximum matching to within a factor better than
O(n
1
2
−2ǫ).
Both our bounds are essentially tight. For deterministic protocols, one can trivially obtain an
approximation ratio of n with message length O(log n): each player sends the index of one arbitrary
item that he is interested in. If randomization is allowed, it is not hard to see that when each player
sends the index of a random item he is interested in, we get an approximation ratio of O(
√
n). We
have therefore established a gap between randomized and deterministic protocols. We also note
that the randomized lower bound can in fact be obtained from more general recent results of [19] in
a stronger model. For completeness we present a significantly simpler direct proof for our setting.
On the positive side, we show that a few communication rounds suffice to get an almost efficient
allocation3. Our algorithm is a specific instantiation of the well known class of “auction algorithms”.
This class of algorithms has its roots in [8] and has been extensively studied from an economic point
of view (e.g. [32]) as well as from a computational point of view (starting with [5]).
The standard ascending auction algorithm for this setting begins by setting the price of each
item to be 0. Initially, all bidders are “unallocated”. Then, in an arbitrary order, each unallocated
2While Hurwicz and other economists employed models that allowed communicating real numbers, we employ the
standard, modern, notions from computer science (see [24]) that count bits. This distinction does not seem to have
any conceptual significance – see [31] for a discussion.
3Formally, the algorithm works in the so called “blackboard model” – see Appendix A for a definition.
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player i reports an index of an item that maximizes his profit in the current prices (his “demand”).
The price of that item increases by ǫ and the item is reallocated to player i, and the process continues
with another unallocated player. It is well known that if the maximum that a player is willing to
pay for an item is 1, then this process terminates after at most Ω(nǫ ) steps and it is not hard to
construct examples where this is tight. We show that if in each round every unallocated player
reports, simultaneously with the others, an index of a random item that maximizes his profit in the
current prices (O(log n) bits of information) and each reported item is re-allocated to an arbitrary
player that reported it, then the process terminates in logarithmically many rounds. We are not
aware of any other scenario where natural market dynamics provably converge (approximately) to
an equilibrium in time that is sub-linear in the market size.
Theorem: Fix ǫ > 0. After O( log n
ǫ2
) rounds the randomized algorithm provides in expectation an
(1 + ǫ)-approximation to the bipartite matching problem.
We then quantify the tradeoff between the amount of interaction and economic efficiency. We show
that for every k ≥ 1 there is a randomized protocol that obtains an O(n1/(k+1))-approximation in
k rounds, where at each round each player sends O(log n) bits of information.
In passing we note that the communication complexity of the exact problem, i.e. of finding
an exact perfect matching, when it exists, remains a very interesting open problem. Moreover, we
believe that it may shed some light on basic algorithmic challenges of finding a perfect matching
in near-linear time as well as deterministically in parallel. We shortly present this direction in
appendix A.
1.2 Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders
Our second set of results concerns a setting where we are selling m items to n bidders in a com-
binatorial auction. Here each player i has a valuation vi that specifies his value for every possible
subset S of items. The goal is to maximize the “social welfare”
∑
i vi(Ai), where Ai is the set of
goods that is allocated to player i. The communication requirements in such settings have received
much attention and it is known that, for arbitrary valuations, exponential amount of communica-
tion is required to achieve even m1/2−ǫ-approximation of the optimal welfare [31]. However, it is
also known that if the valuations are subadditive, vi(S ∪ T ) ≤ vi(S) + vi(T ), then constant factor
approximations can be achieved using only polynomial communication [12, 13, 33, 10, 26]. Can
this level of approximate welfare be achieved by a direct mechanism, without interaction?
Two recent lines of research touch on this issue. On one hand several recent papers show that
valuations cannot be “compressed”, even approximately, and that any polynomial-length descrip-
tion of subadditive valuations (or even the more restricted XOS valuations) must lose a factor of
Θ(
√
m) in precision [3, 2]. Similar, but somewhat weaker, non-approximation results are also known
for the far more restricted subclass of “gross-substitutes” valuations [4] for which exact optimiza-
tion is possible with polynomial communication. Thus the natural approach for a direct mechanism
where each player sends a succinctly specified approximate version of his valuation (a “sketch”) to
the central planner cannot lead to a better than O(
√
m) approximation. This does not, however,
rule out other approaches for non-interactive allocation, that do not require approximating the
whole valuation. Indeed we show that one can do better:
Theorem: There exists a deterministic communication protocol such that each player holds a sub-
additive valuation and sends (simultaneously with the others) polynomially many bits of communi-
cation to the central planner that guarantees an O˜(m1/3)-approximation to the optimal allocation.
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Another line of relevant research considers bidders with such valuations being put in a game where
they can only bid on each item separately [7, 6, 16, 14]. In such games the message of each
bidder is by definition only O(m) real numbers, each can be specified in sufficient precision with
logarithmically-many bits. Surprisingly, it turns out that sometimes this suffices to get constant
factor approximation of the social welfare. Specifically one such result [14] considers a situation
where the valuation vi of each player i is drawn independently from a commonly known distribution
Di on subadditive valuations. In such a case, every player i can calculate bids on the items –
requiring O(m logm) bits of communication – based only on his valuation vi and the distributions
Dj of the others (but not their valuations vj). By allocating each item to the highest bidder we get
a 2-approximation to the social welfare, in expectation over the distribution of valuations. This is
a non-interactive protocol that comes tantalizingly close to what we desire: all that remains is for
the 2-approximation to hold for every input rather than in expectation. Using Yao’s principle, this
would follow (at least for a randomized protocol) if we could get an approximation in expectation for
every distribution on the inputs, not just the product distribution where the valuations are chosen
independently. While the approximation guarantees of [7, 6, 16, 14] do not hold for correlated
distributions on the valuations, there are other settings where similar approximation results do
hold even for correlated distributions [27, 1]. Would this be possible here too?
Our main technical construction proves a negative answer and shows that interaction is essential
for obtaining approximately optimal allocation among subadditive valuations (even for the more
restricted XOS valuations):
Theorem: No (deterministic or randomized) protocol such that each player holds an XOS valuation
and simultaneously with the others sends sub-exponentially many bits of communication to a central
planner can guarantee an m
1
4
−ǫ-approximation.
Again, this is in contrast to interactive protocols that can achieve a factor 2 approximation [12]
(with polynomially many rounds of communication). The lower bound shows that interaction is
necessary to solve the economic calculation problem in combinatorial auctions. We show that if a
small amount of interaction is allowed then one can get significantly better results:
Theorem: For every k ≥ 1 there is a randomized protocol that obtains an O˜(k · m1/(k+1))-
approximation in k rounds, where at each round each player sends poly(m,n) bits. In particular,
after k = logm rounds we get a poly-logarithmic approximation to the welfare.
Open Questions. In our opinion the most intriguing open question is to determine the possible
approximation ratio achievable by simultaneous combinatorial auctions with submodular or even
gross-substitutes players that are allowed to send poly(m,n) bits. Our O(m
1
3 )-algorithm is clearly
applicable for both settings. We do know that exactly solving the problem for gross-substitutes
valuations requires exponential communication (see Section B), although when interaction is allowed
polynomial communication suffices.
Another natural open question is to prove lower bounds on the approximation ratio achievable by
k-round protocols. Our bounds only hold for k = 1. Furthermore, how good is the approximation
ratio that can be guaranteed when incentives are taken into account? Can a truthful k-round
algorithm guarantee poly-logarithmic approximation in O(log n) rounds for XOS valuations?
For the bipartite matching setting we leave open the question of developing algorithms for
weighted bipartite matching. In addition, our k-round algorithms are randomized; developing
deterministic k-round algorithms even for the unweighted case is also of interest. In Appendix
A we further discuss more open questions related to the communication complexity of bipartite
matching and its relation to the computational complexity of bipartite matching.
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Finally, we studied the matching problem in the framework of simultaneous communication
complexity. A fascinating future direction is to study other classic combinatorial optimization
problems (e.g., minimum cut, packing and covering problems, etc.) using the lenses of simultaneous
communication complexity.
2 Preliminaries
Combinatorial Auctions. In a combinatorial auction we have a set N of players (|N | = n)
and a set M of different items (|M | = m). Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2M → R.
Each vi is assumed to be normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and non decreasing. The goal is to maximize the
social welfare, that is, to find an allocation of the items to players (A1, . . . , An) that maximizes
the welfare: Σivi(Ai). A valuation function is subadditive if for every two bundles S and T ,
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ). A valuation v is additive if for every bundle S we have that v(S) =
Σj∈Sv({j}). A valuation v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a1, . . . , at such that for every
bundle S, v(S) = maxr ar(S). Each ar is a clause of v. If a ∈ argmaxr ar(S) then a is a maximizing
clause of S.
Matching. Here the goal is to find a maximum matching in an undirected bipartite graph G =
(V1, V2, E), |V1| = |V2| = n. Each player i corresponds to vertex i ∈ V1 and is only aware of edges
of the form (i, j) (j ∈ V2 since the graph is bipartite). The neighbor set of i is Si = {j|(i, j) ∈ E}.
The goal is to maximize the number of matched pairs. When convenient we will refer to vertices on
the left as unit demand bidders and the vertices on the right as goods. Under this interpretation
the neighbor set of player i is simply the set of goods that he is interested in.
Chernoff Bounds. Let X be a random variable with expectation µ. Then, for any δ > 0:
P (X > (1 + δ)µ) < (
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ = (
eδ
e(1+δ) ln(1+δ)
)µ = (
1
e(1+δ) ln(1+δ)−δ
)µ. For δ > e2 we can
loosely bound this expression by: (
1
eδ
)µ.
3 Lower Bounds for Bipartite Matching
In this section we state lower bounds on the power of algorithms for bipartite matching. The first
one deals with the power of deterministic algorithms (proof in Subsection 3.1):
Theorem 3.1 (lower bound for deterministic algorithms) The approximation ratio of any
deterministic simultaneous algorithm for matching that uses at most l bits per player is no better
than
n
8l + 4 log(n)
. In particular, for any fixed ǫ > 0 and l = nǫ the approximation ratio is Ω(n1−ǫ).
The second theorem gives a lower bound on the power of randomized algorithms (proof in
Subsection 3.2):
Theorem 3.2 (lower bound for randomized algorithms) Fix ǫ > 0. The approximation ra-
tio of every algorithm in which each player sends a message of size l ≤ n 12−α− ǫ2 is at most nα, for
every α ≤ 12 − ǫ.
The next proposition shows that both lower bounds are essentially tight. In particular, this
implies a proven gap between the power of deterministic and randomized algorithms.
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Proposition 3.3
1. There exists a deterministic simultaneous algorithm that uses l bits per player and provides
an approximation ratio of max(2, n lognl ).
2. There exists a simultaneous randomized algorithm that provides an expected approximation
ratio of O(
√
n).
Proof: The randomized algorithm will be obtained as a corollary of the k-round algorithm of
Subsection 4.2 (k = 1). We now describe the deterministic algorithm.
Let l′ = llogn . We consider the algorithm where each player reports the indices of some arbitrary
l′ vertices in his neighbor set. The algorithm matches as many reported vertices as possible.
We now analyze the approximation ratio of the algorithm. Consider some optimal matching.
We distinguish between two cases. The first one is when at least half of the players that are matched
in the optimal solution have at most l′ neighbors (call this set S). In this case, vertices in S can
report their full neighbor set. The algorithm will consider in particular the matching that matches
vertices in S as in the optimal solution, and thus we will get a 2 approximation.
In the second case, most of the players that are matched in the optimal solution have more than
l′ neighbors (call this set T ). Consider the matching that the algorithm outputs. If all vertices in T
are matched, then we get a 2 approximation. Otherwise, there is a player i ∈ T that is not matched
by the algorithm. This implies that all the l′ vertices that he reported are already matched, and
this is a lower bound to the number of matches that the algorithm outputs. The theorem follows
since the optimal matching makes at most n matches.
3.1 Hardness of Deterministic Matching
In the proof we assume that our graphs are w-uniform graphs. That is, the size of neighbor set Si
for every player i is w. Notice that this assumption only makes our hardness result stronger. For
this proof, we fix a specific simultaneous algorithm and analyze its properties.
We begin by considering a specific random construction of graphs that we name w-random. In
a w-random graph we choose |U | = w vertices from V2 uniformly at random and let the neighbor
set of each one of the players be Si = U . Let (a1, . . . , an) be the output of the algorithm on this
instance. As the optimal matching includes exactly w matched players it is clear that the solution
outputted by the algorithm matches at most w players. The crux of the proof is constructing
a “fooling instance”, where all players send the same messages and hence the algorithm cannot
distinguish the fooling instance from the original instance and outputs the same allocation. We
will construct this fooling instance so that on one hand for almost every player i, ai is not in the
neighbour set of player i (this will be true to approximately n− 2w players). This implies that the
value of the matching that the algorithm outputs in the fooling instance is low. On the other hand,
the size of the optimal matching in the fooling instance will be α = Θ(n).
Let gi(V ) denote the message that player i sends when his neighbor set is V . Let Gi(m) =
{V |gi(V ) = m} and Gi(V ) = Gi(gi(V )). The main challenge in the proof is constructing a fooling
set with a large optimal matching. The next definition provides us the machinery required for
proving this:
Definition 3.4 For a player i and neighbor set Si, Si is α-unsafe for a vertex k /∈ Si if |∪U∈Gi(Si),k /∈U
U | ≥ α. Otherwise, we say that Si is α-safe for k.
For a w-random graph we say that player i is α-adaptable if the neighbor set Si is α-unsafe for
ai. We will first formalize the discussion above by constructing a fooling instance given that there
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are |P | α-adaptable players. Later, we will show that there exists an instance in which |P | ≈ n−2w
players are α-adaptable.
Lemma 3.5 Consider a w-random graph in which a set P of the players are α-adaptable. Then,
there exists a fooling instance for which at least min(|P |, α) vertices can be matched, but the algo-
rithm returns a solution with at most w matched vertices.
Proof: The fooling instance is constructed as follows: for each player i ∈ P , let S′i be some
neighbor set such that ai /∈ S′i and S′i ∈ Gi(Si). Such S′i exists since by assumption player i is
an α-adaptable player which implies that ai is α-unsafe for Si. For any such choice of S
′
i we have
that players in P are still not matched by the algorithm. The number of matchings in the fooling
instance is therefore at most w. Notice that this argument holds for any set of S′i’s chosen as above.
To guarantee that at least min(|P |, α) vertices can be matched in the new instance, we have to
be more careful in our choice of the S′i’s. We say that player i with neighbor set Si is interested in
vertex j ∈ V2 if there exists a neighbor set S′i where ai /∈ S′i, S′i ∈ Gi(Si), and j ∈ S′i. Since for
every i ∈ P we know that ai is α-unsafe for Si, there exists at least α vertices which player i is
interested in. Thus by Hall’s marriage theorem there exists a matching of at least α vertices among
the players in P where each player is matched to a vertex that he is interested in. This implies that
there exists a set of neighbor set S′i as above where at least min(|P |, α) vertices can be matched in
the fooling instance.
We now show that there exists a w-random graph in which the number of α-adaptable players
is large:
Lemma 3.6 Let p =
2l · n(αw)(n
w
) . There exists a w-random graph in which at least (1− p) · n−w of
the players are α-adaptable.
Proof: We first show that for each player i the number of neighbor sets that are α-safe for at
least one vertex is small.
Claim 3.7 For each player i there are at most 2l · n(αw) possible neighbor sets (of size w) that are
α-safe for at least one vertex.
Proof: Consider a message m and a vertex k ∈ V2. Observe that by definition for every set
S which is α-safe for k we have that S ⊆ ∪U∈Gi(Si),k /∈UU and that | ∪U∈Gi(Si),k /∈U U | ≤ α. This
immediately implies that there are at most
(α
w
)
neighbor sets in Gi(m) that are α-safe for k. This
is true for each of the n vertices in V2 and hence there are at most n
(α
w
)
neighbor sets in Gi(m)
that are α-safe for at least one vertex. The proof is completed by observing that there are at most
2l different messages.
We are now ready to show that there exists a w-random graph with the required number of
α-adaptable players. Observe that in a w-random graph, for each player i the probability that Si
is α-safe for some vertex k /∈ Si is at most
2l · n(αw)(n
w
) = p. This is simply because by construction
the neighbor set Si of player i is chosen uniformly at random from all possible neighbor sets (the
neighbor sets of any two players are indeed correlated).
We now show that there exists a w-random graph in which there is a set P ′, |P ′| ≥ (1 − p) · n
where for each i ∈ P ′ we have that Si is α-unsafe for every k /∈ Si. To see why this is the case, for
each player i, let ni be a random variable that gets a value of 1 if Si is α-unsafe for every k /∈ Si
and a value of 0 otherwise. Let n′ = Σini. By the first part, for any player i, E[ni] ≥ 1− p. Using
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linearity of expectation, E[n′] ≥ n · (1 − p). The claim follows since there must be at least one
instance I where n′ ≥ E[n′].
To conclude the proof, observe that in the instance I any player i ∈ P for which ai /∈ Si is
an α-adaptable player. Since there are at most w players for which ai ∈ Si we have that at least
|P ′| − w = (1− p) · n− w players are α-adaptable, as required.
Finally, we compute the values of our parameters and show that the theorem indeed holds.
Lemma 3.8 For α = n4 and w = 2l+ log(n), the approximation ratio of a simultaneous algorithm
in which each message length is at most l bits is
n
8l + 4 log(n)
.
Proof: We first compute a lower bound on the number of α-adaptable players. By Lemma 3.6,
we have that the number of α-adaptable players is a least (1 − p) · n− w. By Claim 3.9 below we
have that (1− p) ≥ (1− (14)l), thus (1− p) · n− w > α. Therefore the approximation ratio of the
algorithm is at most
α
w
=
n
4
2l + log(n)
=
n
8l + 4 log(n)
.
Claim 3.9 For α = n4 and w = 2l + log(n): p ≤
2l·n(αw)
(nw)
≤ (14)l.
Proof:
2l · n(αw)(
n
w
) = 2ln · α! · (n− w)!
(α− w)! · n! = 2
ln ·
∏w
i=1(α− w + i)∏w
i=1(n− w + i)
≤ 2ln ·
(α
n
)w
.
By plugging in the values of α and w we get:
2ln ·
(α
n
)w ≤ 2ln ·
(
1
4
)2l+log(n)
≤ n
(
1
4
)l+log(n)
≤
(
1
4
)l
.
3.2 Hardness of Randomized Matching
We consider a bipartite graph (V1, V2, E) with n vertices in each side. As usual, the left-side
vertices are the players. We prove a lower bound for randomized algorithms in this setting. By
Yao’s principle, it is enough to prove a lower bound on the power of deterministic mechanisms on
some distribution.
The hard distribution on which we will prove the lower bound is the following:
1. The size of the neighbor set Si of each player i is exactly k + 1, where k = n
1
2 .
2. The neighbor sets Si are chosen, in a correlated way, as follows: a set T of size exactly 2k
is chosen uniformly at random, and each Si is obtained by independently taking a random
subset of size exactly k of T and another single random element from T c (the complement of
T ).
3. The players do not know T nor do they know which of their elements is the one from T c.
We will prove the lower bound by reducing the matching problem to the following two player
problem.
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3.2.1 A 2-Player Problem: The Hidden Item
In the hidden item problem there are two players (Alice and Bob) and n items. In this problem
Alice holds a subset T of the items of size exactly 2k (k = n
1
2 ). Bob holds a set S of size exactly
k+1. The guarantee is that |S∩T | = k. Bob sends a message to Alice of length l who must output
an item x (based only on the message that she got and T ). Alice and Bob win if x ∈ S − T .
We will analyze the power of deterministic mechanisms on the following distribution:
1. T is selected uniformly at random among all subsets that consist of exactly 2k items.
2. S is selected in a correlated way by taking a random subset of size k from T and a random
extra element from T c (without knowing which is which).
Lemma 3.10 If inputs are drawn from the above distribution, in any deterministic algorithm the
probability that Alice and Bob win is at most O(n−α), for any α and l such that nα · l = o(n 12 ).
The lemma will be proved in Subsection 3.2.2. We first show why the lemma implies Theorem
3.2.
Lemma 3.11 Let α < 12 − ǫ. If there exists a deterministic algorithm for the hard distribution of
the matching problem that provides an approximation ratio of nα where each player sends a message
of length l, then there exists an algorithm for the hard distribution of the hidden item problem where
Bob sends a message of length l and the probability of success is 120nα .
Proof: Assume a deterministic algorithm for the hard matching distribution achieving an approx-
imation ratio better than nα. Observe that the optimal social welfare is at least n10 with very high
probability. Thus, an expected social welfare of n
1−α
10 is required for achieving this approximation
ratio. Clearly at most 2k = 2n
1
2 < n
1
2
+ǫ/20 < n1−α/20 of this expected social welfare comes from
items in T (for big enough n). Thus, the expected social welfare, obtained just from items outside
T is at least n
1−α
20 .
This implies that there exists some player, without loss of generality player 1, whose expected
value, not including any item in T , is at least 120nα . We will use this protocol to construct the two-
player protocol, by Bob simulating player 1 and Alice simulating all the other players combined.
When Alice and Bob get their inputs S and T for the hidden item problem, Alice uses T to
choose at random S2, ..., Sn as to fit the distribution of the n-player problem, and Bob sets S1 = S.
Bob sends to Alice the message player 1 sends in the n-player algorithm for matching. Alice first
simulates the messages of all players and then calculates the outcome (a1, ..., an) of the n-player
matching. Notice that whenever player 1 in the n-player protocol gets utility 1 from an item outside
of T , we have that x ∈ S − T . Thus Alice and Bob win with probability at least 120nα .
Theorem 3.2 now follows as we have by Lemma 3.10 that for l ≤ n 12−α− ǫ2 and α ≤ 12 − ǫ the
probability of success in the hidden item problem is O(n−α). This together with Lemma 3.11
implies that there cannot be an algorithm for matching achieving an approximation ratio better
than nα using l ≤ n 12−α− ǫ2 bits for α ≤ 12 − ǫ.
3.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3.10
Assume that a protocol with a better winning probability than O(n−α) exists. We will use random-
self-reducibility to get a randomized (public coin) protocol that will work for all pairs of sets S, T
with |S| = k + 1, |T | = 2k, |S − T | = 1. This is obtained by the two players choosing jointly
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a random permutation of the n items and running the protocol on their permuted items. Notice
that this randomized reduction maps any original input to exactly the distribution on which we
assumed the original protocol worked well, and thus now the winning probability, for any fixed
input of the specified form, is at least O(n−α). We now run this protocol O(nα) times in parallel
(with independent random choices) to get a situation where Bob sends O(nα · l) bits and Alice
outputs a set of size O(nα) that with high probability contains the element in S − T .
We will use the known hardness for the disjointness two-player communication-complexity prob-
lem:
Theorem 3.12 (Razborov) Assume that Alice holds a subset S and Bob holds a subset R of a
universe of size m where, |S| = m/4, |T | = m/4. Distinguishing between the case that S∩R = ∅ and
the case that |S∩R| = 1 requires Ω(m) randomized (multiple round, constant-error) communication.
Corollary 3.13 By using a simple padding argument, we have that for m = 4k and a setting where
Alice holds a set S of size k + 1 of a universe of size n and Bob holds a set R of size n − 2k of
the same universe, distinguishing between S ∩ R = ∅ and |S ∩ R| = 1 requires Ω(m) randomized
communication.
We now show how to use an algorithm for the hidden instance problem to solve the hard problem
described in the previous corollary: let T = Rc and use the protocol constructed in which Alice
outputs a set of size O(nα) that with high probability contains the element in S − T = S ∩R, she
will now send this whole list back to Bob who will report which of these elements is in S. We have
now achieved a 2-round protocol (Bob → Alice → Bob) that uses O(nα) · l bits of communication
that finds the element in S ∩R with high probability, if such an element existed. Otherwise, such
an element is not found so we have distinguished the two possibilities.
To reach a contradiction our protocol has to use less than Ω(m) bits. Thus for a contradiction
to be reached it must hold that nα · l = o(m) = o(k).
4 Algorithms for Bipartite Matching
We provide two algorithms that guarantee significantly better approximation ratios using a small
number of rounds. We first show that O( logn
δ2
) rounds suffice to get a (1 + δ) approximation. In
Subsection 4.2 we present an algorithm that provides an approximation ratio of O(n
1
k+1 ) in k rounds.
This shows that even a constant number of rounds suffices to get much better approximation ratios
than what can be achieved by simultaneous algorithms.
4.1 A (1 + δ)-Approximation for Bipartite Matching in O( logn
δ2
) Rounds
The algorithm is based on an auction where each player competes at every point on one item that
he demands the most at the current prices. Therefore, it will be easier for us to imagine the players
as having valuations. Specifically, each player i is a unit demand bidder with vi(j) = 1 if j ∈ Si
and vi(j) = 0 otherwise.
The Algorithm
1. For every item j let pj = 0.
2. Let N1 be the set of all players.
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3. In every round r = 1, . . . , 2 logn
δ2
:
(a) For each player i ∈ Nr, let the demand of i be Di = argminj:pj<1,j∈Si pj. This is the
subset of Si for which the price of each item is minimal and smaller than 1.
(b) Each player i ∈ Nr selects uniformly at random an item ji ∈ Di and reports its index.
(c) Go over the players in Nr in a fixed arbitrary order. If item ji was not yet allocated
in this round, player i receives it and the price pji is increased by δ. In this case we
say that player i is committed to item ji. A player i
′ that was committed to ji in the
previous round (if such exists) now becomes uncommitted.
(d) Let Nr+1 be the set of uncommitted players at the end of round r.
Our algorithm is very similar to the classical auction algorithms except for two seemingly
small changes. However, quite surprisingly, these changes allow us to substantially reduce the
communication cost. The first change is to ask all the players to report an item of their demand
set simultaneously (instead of sequentially). This change alone is not enough as in the worst case
many players might report the same item and hence the number of rounds might still be Ω(nδ ).
Hence we ask each player to report a random item of his demand instead.
Theorem 4.1 After O( logn
δ2
) rounds the algorithm above provides an approximation ratio of (1+δ).
Proof: Fix some optimal solution (o1, ..., on) (every player receives at most one item). Let N
′,
|N ′| = n′, be the set of players that receive an item in the optimal solution.
Definition 4.2 A player is called satisfied if he is either allocated an item or Di = ∅.
Let END be the random variable that denotes the number of rounds until the first time that
(1− δ)n′ players in N ′ are satisfied. We will prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3 E[END] ≤ 4 lognδ2 .
Proof: The heart of the proof is the definition of two budgets: one for demand halving actions
for players in N ′ and one for price increments. We show that in expectation after at most 4 logn
δ2
rounds at least one of these budgets is exhausted and hence the number of unsatisfied players in
N ′ is at most δn′.
Consider the demand set Di of some player i at some round r. Observe that all items in Di has
the same price pDi . Let D
p
i = Si ∩ {j|pj = p}. We will use the following claim:
Claim 4.4 Consider some round r and suppose that at least t players are unsatisfied in the begin-
ning of that round. Then, either the expected increase in Σjpj is at least t · δ4 or for at least half of
the unsatisfied players it holds that D
pDi
i has shrunk by at least a factor of 2.
Proof: Consider some player i that is not satisfied. When it is i’s turn to be considered in Step
3c either at least half the items in Di were taken by previous players in the order or not. If at least
half the items in Di were taken by previous players then D
pDi
i has shrunk by a factor of at least
2. Otherwise, since player i selects ji at random from Di, with probability of at least
1
2 we have
that ji was not taken by any previous player. In this case i the price of pji is increased by δ so the
expected increase of some item due to i is δ2 . This implies that either for at least t/2 players D
pDi
i
has shrunk by at least a factor of 2 or at least t/2 players caused an expected increase of δ/2 in
the price of some item. The later implies by linearity of expectation an expected total increase of
t · δ4 .
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Now, notice that the price of each item can be increased at most 1δ times (the price increases
in increments of δ and no player demands an item which has a value of 1). Since an item that was
allocated stays allocated and at most n′ items can be allocated, we have that the maximal number
of increments that the algorithm can make is n
′
δ .
In addition, there are n items and the price of an item can only increase, each Dpi can be shrunk
by a factor of 2 at most log n time. As previously argued, p can get only 1δ different values. The
total number of shrinkage steps with respect to players in N ′ is therefore n
′ logn
δ .
To complete the proof recall that at every round prior to END at least δn′ players in N ′ are
unsatisfied. By the claim in each round either the expected number of increments is δn
′
4 or the
expected number of shrinkage steps with respect to players in N ′ is δn
′
2 . In any case, after
4 logn
δ2
rounds we expect that there are no more increments or shrinkage steps with respect to players in
N ′ to make.
Lemma 4.5 If at least (1 − δ)n′ of the players in N ′ are satisfied then the approximation of the
algorithm is 1− 2δ.
Proof: We use a variant of the first welfare theorem to prove the lemma. Consider a player i
that has received an item ji. The player receives an item that maximizes his demand (up to δ),
and thus the profit from ji is at least the profit from the item oi he got in the optimal solution (up
to δ, we allow oi = ∅). We therefore have: vi(ji) − pji ≥ vi(oi)− poi − δ. For each satisfied player
i that did not receive any items we have that 0 ≥ vi(oi) − poi . Denote by Ns the set of satisfied
players. Summing over all satisfied players we get:
∑
i∈Ns
(vi(ji)− pji) ≥
∑
i ∈ Ns is allocated
(vi(oi)− poi − δ) +
∑
i ∈ Ns is unallocated
(vi(oi)− poi)
=
∑
i∈Ns
(vi(oi)− poi)− δn′
ALG−
∑
j∈N
pj ≥ OPT − δn′ −
∑
i∈Ns
poi − n′δ
ALG ≥ OPT − 2n′δ = (1− 2δ)n′
where in the third transition we used the facts that items that are unallocated by the algorithm
have a price of 0 and that N ′ ∩Ns ≥ (1− δ)N ′.
It is worth noting a different version of the auction algorithm which was discussed in [8]. In
this version at every round each player reports its entire demand set (simultaneously with the
other players), then a minimal set of over demanded items is computed and only their prices are
increased. While the number of rounds for this algorithm might be small the communication cost
of each round can be linear in n.
4.2 A k-Round Algorithm for Matching
Fix some optimal solution (o1, ..., on) (every player receives at most one item). Let N
′ be the set of
players that receive a nonempty bundle in the optimal solution. The following algorithm achieves
an approximation ratio of O(n
1
k+1 ) in k rounds.
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The Algorithm
1. Let N1 = V1 and U1 = V2.
2. In every round r = 1, . . . , k:
(a) Each player i selects uniformly at random an item ji ∈ Ui that he demands.
(b) Go over the players in Nr in a fixed arbitrary order. Player i receives ji if this item was
not allocated yet.
(c) Let Nr+1 ⊆ Nr be the set of players that were not allocated items at round r or before.
(d) Let Ur+1 ⊆ Ur be the set of items that were not allocated at round r or before.
Theorem 4.6 For every k ≤ log n, the approximation ratio of the algorithm is O(n 1k+1 ). In
particular, when k = 1 the approximation ratio is O(
√
n) and when k = O(log n) the approximation
ratio is O(1).
Proof: Consider a run of the algorithm. Let Dr,i ⊆ Ur be the set of items that player i demands
and are still available immediately before round r starts. Let Xr,i be the set of items that where
allocated to other players before i’s turn in step (2b). Player i is said to be easy to satisfy if in some
round r we have that Dr,i−Xr,i ≥ Dr,i
n
1
k+1
. Let S be the event that at least half of the players in N ′ are
easy to satisfy. We will show that E[ALG|S] = O( OPT
n
1
k+1
) and that E[ALG|S¯] = O( OPT
n
1
k+1
), where
ALG is the random variable that denotes the value of the solution that the algorithm outputs.
Together this implies that E[ALG] = O( OPT
n
1
k+1
). Each one of the next two lemmas handles one of
those cases.
Lemma 4.7 E[ALG|S] = O( OPT
n
1
k+1
).
Proof: Let Ci,r be the random variable that denotes the probability that player i is allocated
an item at round r. Observe that if player i is easy to satisfy then for some round r we have that
E[Ci,r] ≥ 1
n
1
k+1
. Let P denote the set of easy to satisfy players. The expected number of easy
to satisfy players that are allocated an item is at least E[Σi∈PCi,r] = Σi∈PE[Ci,r] ≥ |P | · 1
n
1
k+1
≥
n′
2 · 1
n
1
k+1
. The required approximation ratio follows since the value of the optimal solution is n′.
Lemma 4.8 E[ALG|S¯] = O( OPT
n
1
k+1
).
Proof: Consider a player i that is not easy to satisfy. Observe the for every such player i and
round r, if i ∈ Nr ∩ Nr+1 then |Dr,i| ≥ n
1
k+1 |Dr+1,i|. This is true since if such player i was not
allocated any items at round r then the set of available items that he demands shrinks. Therefore,
for every player i that was not allocated anything at round k, we have that |Dk+1,i| ≤ n
1
k+1 . If there
exists a player i such that |Dk+1,i| > 0 then it has to be the case that initially |D1,i| ≥ n
k
k+1 . This
implies that at least n
k
k+1 − n 1k+1 of the items were allocated and hence the approximation ratio is
O(n
1
k+1 ) (there are m items, so the value of the optimal solution is at most m). In any other case
for every such player i that was not allocated any bundle we have that Dk+1,i = ∅. In particular,
the item oi that he receives in the optimal solution was allocated. Since there are at least
n′
2 such
players, this implies that at least n
′
2 items were allocated and proves the claimed approximation
bound in this case as well.
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5 A Lower Bound for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
We now move to discuss combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In particular, in this
section we prove our most technical result:
Theorem 5.1 No randomized simultaneous protocol for combinatorial auctions with subadditive
bidders where each bidder sends sub-exponentially many bits can approximate the social welfare to
within a factor of m
1
4
−ǫ, for every constant ǫ > 0.
We will actually prove the lower bound using only XOS valuations, a subclass of subadditive
valuations. We present a distribution over the inputs and show that any deterministic algorithm
in which each bidder sends sub-exponentially many bits cannot approximate the expected social
welfare to within a factor of m1/4−ǫ for this specific distribution (where expectation is taken over
the distribution). This implies, by Yao’s principle, that there is no randomized algorithm that
achieves an approximation ratio of m1/4−ǫ for every constant ǫ > 0.
Our hard distribution which we denote by D is the following:
• n = k3 players, m = k3 + k4 items.
• Each player i gets a family Fi of size t = e2kǫ of sets of k items. The valuation of player i is
defined to be: vi(S) = maxT∈Fi |T ∩ S|. Observe that this is an XOS valuation where each
set S ∈ Fi defines a clause in which all items in S have value 1 and the rest of the items have
value 0.
• The families Fi are chosen, in a correlated way, as follows: first, a center C of size k3 is
chosen at random; then for each player i a petal Pi of size k
2 is chosen at random from the
complement of C. Now, for each player i, the family Fi is chosen as follows: one set Ti of size
k is chosen at random from Pi and t− 1 sets of size k are chosen at random from C ∪ Pi.
• The players do not know C nor do they know which of the sets was chosen from Pi. We may
assume without loss of generality that each player i knows the set C ∪ Pi.
Each player sends, deterministically, simultaneously with the others, at most l bits of commu-
nication just based on his input Fi. A referee that sees all the messages chooses an allocation
A1, . . . , An of the m items to the n players (only based on the messages), with the Ai’s being
disjoint sets. We assume without loss of generality that all items are allocated.
In order to prove that no deterministic algorithm can obtain a good approximation for instances
drawn from D, we show that to get a good approximation we must identify Ti for almost all of the
players. This would have been easy had each player could have distinguished between the items in C
and Pi, but this information is missing. We show that for the central planner to successfully identify
even a single Ti player i has to send exponentially many bits. Formally, this is done by reducing the
two-player “set seeking” problem that we define below to the multi-player combinatorial auction
problem. The main technical challenge is to prove the hardness of the set seeking problem.
The next couple of lemmas together gives us Theorem 5.1. The proof of the first lemma is easy,
but the second lemma is the heart of the lower bound.
Lemma 5.2 With very high probability, over this distribution (D), there exists an allocation with
social welfare
∑
i vi(Ai) = Θ(k
4).
Proof: Consider allocating each player i the set Ti (an item j that is in multiple Ti’s will be
allocated to some player i such that j ∈ Ti). The social welfare of this allocation is |∪iTi|. We show
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that with high probability the social welfare is Θ(k4). This follows since each Ti is of size k and
is practically selected uniformly at random from a set of size k4. Thus, the probability that item
j is in Ti is 1/k
3. Since there are k3 players, an item is in ∪iTi with constant probability. Next,
since items are chosen independently we can use Chernoff bounds to get that with high probability
a constant fraction of all items is in ∪iTi.
Lemma 5.3 Every deterministic protocol for the combinatorial auction problem with l < tǫ pro-
duces an allocation with
∑
i vi(Ai) = k
3+O(ǫ), in expectation (over the distribution).
To prove Lemma 5.3 we first define a two-player “set seeking” problem and show its hard-
ness (Subsection 5.1). Next, we reduce the two-player set seeking problem to our multi-player
combinatorial auction problem (Subsection 5.2).
5.1 The Two Player “Set Seeking” Problem
The “Set Seeking” problem includes two players and x = k2 + k3 items. One of the players plays
the role of the keeper and gets as an input a family of t = e2k
ǫ
sets F where all the sets are of
size k. The other player plays the role of the seeker and gets a set P of size k2. In this problem,
first the keeper sends a message of at most l bits (advice). Next, based on this message the seeker
outputs some set A ⊆ P, |A| ≥ k. The goal is to maximize maxT∈F |A ∩ T ||A| .
We will analyze the performance of deterministic algorithms on a specific distribution (D2) for
this problem which we now define. This distribution is based on choosing two sets, F and P which
are chosen in correlation as follows:
1. A set P of size k2 is chosen uniformly at random from all items.
2. The set F is constructed by choosing uniformly at random a special set TP of size k from P
and additional t− 1 sets of size k from all items.
Lemma 5.4 If l ≤ tǫ then there is no k1−ǫ-approximation for the set seeking problem.
Proof: Fix a message m and let Am(P ) denote the set A that the seeker returns when his input
is P and the keeper sends a message m.
Definition 5.5 Fix a message m and a set P , |P | = k2. A set S is (m,P )-compatible if |Am(P )∩
S| ≥ |Am(P )|
k1−ǫ
.
Claim 5.6 Fix a message m and a set P , |P | = k2. The probability that a set S which is chosen
uniformly at random from P is (m,P )-compatible is at most 2e−k
ǫ
.
Proof: We fix a set Am(P ) = A ⊆ P and compute the probability that the intersection of this set
with a set S of size k chosen uniformly at random out of k2 items will be greater than
|A|
k1−ǫ
. The
probability of each element in S to be in A∩ S is exactly |A|
k2
. Thus we expect that |A∩ S| ≈ |A|
k
.
We now use Chernoff bounds to make this precise.
Consider constructing the following random set T : k items are selected so that each item is
chosen uniformly at random amount the k2 items of P . T is similar to the way S is constructed,
except that it possibly contains less than k items as there is some positive chance that some item
15
in P will be selected twice. We conservatively assume that every item that was selected twice is in
A. Thus, if we bound the probability that |A ∩ T | is too large, we also bound the probability that
|A ∩ S| is too large.
We first bound the probability that more than kǫ items are selected at least twice to T . Since
there are at most k items in T , in the k’th item that we have the select, the probability that we
will choose an already-selected item is at most k−1
k2
≤ 1k . By the Chernoff bounds, the probability
that more than kǫ items are selected twice to T is at most: 1
ekǫ
.
To compute the expected intersection with A, assume k independent variables, each variable
yi is true with probability
|A|
k2
and false with probability 1 − |A|
k2
. Observe that Y =
∑
i yi is
distributed exactly as |T ∩A|. The expectation of Y is |A|
k
. Now by Chernoff bounds we get that:
Pr[Y > kǫ · |A|
k
] ≤
(
1
ekǫ
) |A|
k ≤ 1
ekǫ
. The last transition holds by the assumption that |A| ≥ k.
We have that with probability of at most
2
ekǫ
we have that |A ∩ T | ≤ 2e−kǫ . By our discussion
above, with at most the same probability we have that |A ∩ S| ≤ 2ekǫ .
Definition 5.7 Let F be a family of sets of size k, |F | = t = e2kǫ . We say that a message m is
F -good if Pr[|Am(P ) ∩ T | ≥ |Am(P )|
k1−ǫ
] ≥ e− 12kǫ, where T is chosen uniformly at random from F
and P , |P | = k2, contains T and k2 − k items chosen uniformly at random from the rest of the
items.
Claim 5.8 For every message m, the probability that m is F -good is at most
p′ = e(−
1
2
kǫ)
(ek
ǫ)
where the sets in F are chosen uniformly at random.
Proof: Fix a message m. Consider F where the sets in F are chosen uniformly at random. We
first compute the probability that for a single T ∈ F we have that |Am(P )∩T | ≥ Am(P )
k1−ǫ
. Observe
that every set T ∈ F in this setting can be thought of as chosen uniformly at random from a fixed
set P . Thus that probability is the same as the probability that T is (m,P )-compatible, which is
e−k
ǫ
by Claim 5.6.
Now we would like to compute the probability that m is F -good, that is the probability that
there exist at least e−
1
2
kǫ · |F | = e 32kǫ sets T ∈ F such that |Am(P ) ∩ T | ≥ |Am(P )|
k1−ǫ
. The expected
number of such sets is e−k
ǫ · |F | = ekǫ . By the Chernoff bounds (µ = ekǫ , δ = e 12kǫ) this probability
is at most p′.
We can now finish the proof. Choose F at random. For every m the probability that m is
F -good is at most p′. The message length is l, and the total number of messages is therefore at
most 2l. Thus, by the union bound, the probability that there exists some message m which is
F -good is at most 2l · p′ ≤ 2tǫ · p′ = 2ekǫ
ǫ
· p′ < (2e(− 12kǫ))(ekǫ) < e−ekǫ , where the transition before
the last uses the fact that ǫ < 1. Hence, with probability at least 1 − e−ekǫ every message m is
not F -good for the randomly chosen F . This in turn implies that for a family F and for every
message m the probability for P and T chosen as in Definition 5.7 that T is (m,P )-compatible is
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at most e−
1
2
kǫ . Thus, with probability 1 − e−ekǫ − e− 12kǫ we have that |Am(P ) ∩ T | ≤ |Am(P )|
k1−ǫ
.
This implies that with probability 1− e−ekǫ − e− 12kǫ the approximation ratio is at most k1−ǫ. Even
if with probability e−e
kǫ
+ e−
1
2
kǫ the approximation ratio is 1, the expected approximation ratio is
at most 12k
1−ǫ.
5.2 The Reduction (Set Seeking → Combinatorial Auctions with XOS bidders)
Given the hardness of the set seeking problem, we will be able to derive our result for combinatorial
auctions using the following reduction:
Lemma 5.9 Any protocol for combinatorial auctions on distribution D that achieves approxima-
tion ratio better than m1/4−ǫ where the message length of each player is l can be converted into a
protocol for the two-player set seeking problem on distribution D2 achieving an approximation ratio
of k1−ǫ with the same message length l.
Proof: In the proof we fix an algorithm for the multi-player combinatorial auction problem and
analyze its properties.
Definition 5.10 Fix an algorithm for the XOS problem and consider the distribution D. We say
that player i is good if E[|Ai ∩ Ti|] ≥ max{ |Ai|
k1−ǫ
, kǫ}.
To prove the lemma we first show that if none of the players are good then the algorithms approxi-
mation ratio is bounded by m1/4−ǫ. Else, there exists at least a single player which is good. In this
case we show how the algorithm for combinatorial auctions can be used to get a good approximation
ratio for the set seeking problem.
Claim 5.11 If none of the players is good then the expected approximation ratio is at most m
1
4
−ǫ.
Proof: To give an upper bound on the expected social welfare we assume that the k3 items in
the center are always allocated to players that demand them. We now compute an upper bound
on the contribution of the remaining k4 items to the expected social welfare. Observe that since
none of the players is good, each player contributes at most
|Ai|
k1−ǫ
+ kǫ to the expected social
welfare (of the k4 items). Hence the expected social welfare achieved by the algorithm is at most∑
i(
|Ai|
k1−ǫ
+ kǫ) + |C| = k
4
k1−ǫ
+ k3 · kǫ + k3 ≤ 3k3+ǫ. This implies that the approximation ratio of
the algorithm is k1−ǫ ≤ m 14−ǫ.
Claim 5.12 If there exists a good player then there exists an algorithm for the two-player set
seeking problem that guarantees an approximation ratio of k1−ǫ with the same message length.
Proof: Let player i be the good player. Recall that D is the distribution for the multi-player
combinatorial auction problem and that D2 is the distribution defined for the set seeking problem.
We denote by ED[·] and ED2 [·] expectations taken over the distributions D and D2 respectively. We
show that there exists an algorithm for the set seeking problem achieving expected approximation
ratio of k1−ǫ on D2.
Let the keeper take the role of player i in the multi-player algorithm and the seeker play the
roles of the rest of the n − 1 players. More precisely, the keeper first sends player i’s message to
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the seeker. This is possible as the input of the keeper is identical to the input of the players in the
multi-player problem. Next, the seeker simulates the messages of the remaining players and run
the algorithm internally. This simulation is possible by the assumption that in the multi-player
algorithm all messages are sent simultaneously. The number of items in the combinatorial auction
will be k3 + k4, where the x items of the set seeking problem will correspond to some set X of size
x of items in the combinatorial auction. We first show that given that the information of the seeker
and keeper is drawn in a correlated way from D2, they have enough information to simulate the
correlated distribution D.
The input of the keeper is defined in a straightforward way, where each set in F defines a
clause in the XOS valuation. All items in these clauses are subsets of X. The seeker constructs
the valuations of the other n − 1 players as follows: the items that are in X \ P form the center.
Next the seeker chooses uniformly at random for each player j a petal Pj of the k
4 items not in
the center, a set Tj ⊆ Pj of size k and additional t − 1 sets of size k from C ∪ Pj . Observe that
the distribution of valuations constructed this way is identical to D. The inherent reason for this
is that for player i the distribution of Pi and Ti is identical to the distribution of P , T and F in
D2 as in both cases P and the t− 1 sets in F (or Pi and Fi) are chosen uniformly at random from
a set of size k3 + k2 and T (or Ti) is chosen uniformly at random from P (or Pi). In other words,
the distribution D2 on F,P and T is identical to distribution D projected on Fi, Pi and Ti.
We now observe that since i is a good player we have that ED[|Ai ∩ Ti|] ≥ max{ |Ai|
k1−ǫ
, kǫ}.
We show that this implies an algorithm achieving expected approximation ratio of k1−ǫ for the
two-player set seeking problem. The algorithm works as follows: we first perform the reduction
above, and therefore the distribution we are analyzing is D. Now, if player i was assigned a bundle
Ai of size at least k, the algorithm returns A = Ai. Else, the algorithm returns a bundle A that
contains Ai and additional k − |Ai| arbitrary items. Thus, we have that ED[|A ∩ Ti|] ≥ |A|
k1−ǫ
, as
we made sure that |A| ≥ k implying that |A|
k1−ǫ
≥ kǫ.
We claim that the expected approximation ratio of the algorithm on D2 is k
1−ǫ. As the distri-
bution D2 on F,P and T is identical to distribution D projected on Fi, Pi and Ti, we have that
ED2 [|A ∩ T |] ≥
|A|
k1−ǫ
. Thus, ED2 [
|A ∩ T |
|A| ] ≥
1
k1−ǫ
. This in turn implies that maxS∈F
|A ∩ S|
|A| ≥
1
k1−ǫ
and since the optimal solution has a value of 1 the expected approximation ratio is k1−ǫ.
From the last two claims we get that either the algorithm for the combinatorial auction problem
does not guarantee a good approximation ratio, or that we have constructed an efficient protocol
for the set seeking problem.
6 Algorithms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
We design algorithms for a restricted special case of “t-restricted” instances (see definition below).
We will show however that the existence of a simultaneous algorithm for t-restricted instances
implies a simultaneous approximation algorithm for subadditive bidders with almost the same
approximation ratio.
Definition 6.1 Consider an XOS valuation v(S) = maxr ar(S), where each ar is an additive
valuation. v is called binary if for every ar and item j we have that ar({j}) ∈ {0, µ}, for some µ.
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Definition 6.2 An instance of combinatorial auctions with binary XOS valuations (all with the
same µ, for simplicity and without loss of generality µ = 1) is called t-restricted if there exists an
allocation (A1, . . . , An) such that all the following conditions hold:
1. For every i, vi(Ai) = |Ai|.
2. For every i, either |Ai| = t or |Ai| = 0.
3. t is a power of 2.
4. Σivi(Ai) ≥ OPT
2 logm
.
Proposition 6.3 If there exists a simultaneous algorithm for t-restricted instances that provides
an approximation ratio of α where each bidder sends a message of length l, then there exists a
simultaneous algorithm for subadditive bidders that provides an approximation ratio of O(α · log3m)
where each bidder sends a message of length O(l · log3m).
Proof: The proposition follows from the following three lemmas.
Lemma 6.4 If there exists a simultaneous algorithm for XOS bidders that provides an approxi-
mation ratio of α where each bidder sends a message of length l, then there exists a simultaneous
algorithm for subadditive bidders that provides an approximation ratio of O(α · logm) where each
bidder sends a message of length l.
Proof: For every subadditive valuation there is an XOS valuation that is an O(logm) approxi-
mation of it [9]4; thus, if each player computes this XOS valuation and proceeds as in the algorithm
for XOS valuations we get an algorithm for subadditive valuations, losing only an O(logm) factor
in the approximation ratio.
Lemma 6.5 If there exists a simultaneous algorithm for binary XOS bidders (all with the same µ)
that provides an approximation ratio of α where each bidder sends a message of length l, then there
exists a simultaneous algorithm for XOS bidders that provides an approximation ratio of O(α·logm)
where each bidder sends a message of length O(l · logm).
Proof: We will move from general XOS valuations to binary XOS valuations using the following
notion of projections:
Definition 6.6 A µ-projection of an additive valuation a′ is the following additive valuation a:
a({j}) =
{
µ, if 2µ > a′(j) ≥ µ;
0, otherwise.
A µ-projection of an XOS valuation v is the XOS valuation vµ that consists exactly of all µ-
projections of the additive valuations (clauses) that define v.
Let vmax be maxi vi(M) rounded down to the nearest power of 2. LetM = {vmax2m , vmaxm , . . . , vmax2 , vmax}.
The next claim shows that there exists some µ ∈ M such that the value of the optimal solution
with respect to the µ-projections vµi is only a logarithmic factor away from the value of the optimal
solution with respect to the vi’s. Given the claim below and an algorithm A for binary XOS valua-
tions we can construct the following algorithm for general XOS valuations: each player i computes,
4A valuation v α-approximates a valuation u if for every S we have that u(S) ≥ v(S) ≥ u(S)
α
.
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for every µ ∈ {MAXi2m , MAXim , . . . , MAXi2 ,MAXi}, where MAXi equals vi(M) rounded down to the
nearest power of 2, his µ-projection and sends both µ and the message of length l he would have
sent in the algorithm A if his valuation was vµi . The new algorithm computes now up to |M|
different allocations by running A once for each µ ∈ M, and outputs the allocation with the best
value5. By the claim below, the approximation ratio is O(α · logm). The length of the message
that each bidder sends is O(l · logm).
Claim 6.7 Let OPT be the value of the optimal solution with respect to the vi’s. For every µ ∈ M,
let OPTµ be the value of the optimal solution with respect to the µ-projections v
µ
i . There exists some
µ ∈ M such that OPTµ ≥ OPT
8 logm
.
Proof: Fix some optimal solution (O1, . . . , On). For each player i let ai be the maximizing clause
for the bundle Oi in vi. Now, for every player i and every item j ∈ Oi, put item j into bin x, where
x is a power of 2, if and only if 2x > ai({j}) ≥ x. Let Mx be the set of items in bin x. We claim
that there exists bin µ, µ ≥ vmax2m , for which it holds that ΣiΣj∈Oi∩Mµai({j}) ≥ Σivi(Oi)4 logm . To see
this, first let L be the set of “small” items that are in any of the bins x, x ≤ vmax4m . It holds that
ΣiΣj∈Oi∩Lai({j}) ≤ ΣiΣj∈Oi∩L vmax2m ≤ vmax2 ≤ Σivi(Oi)2 . Thus, we have that Σivi(Oi ∩ ∪x∈MMx) ≥
Σivi(Oi)
2 . Now observe that the number of bins x, x ≥ vmax2m is bounded from above by 2 logm.
Therefore, there exists a bin µ such that Σivi(Oi ∩Mµ) ≥ Σivi(Oi)4 logm . The proof is completed by
observing that Σiv
µ
i (Oi ∩Mµ) ≥ 12Σivi(Oi ∩Mµ) as the µ-projection cuts the value of each of the
item by at most half.
Lemma 6.8 If there exists a simultaneous algorithm for t-restricted instances that provides an
approximation ratio of α where each bidder sends a message of length l, then there exists a simul-
taneous algorithm for binary XOS bidders (with the same µ) that provides an approximation ratio
of O(α · logm) where each bidder sends a message of length O(l · logm).
Proof: We will show that for every instance of combinatorial auctions with binary XOS
bidders there exists some t for which this instance is t-restricted. Given algorithms At for t-
restricted instances we can construct an algorithm for binary XOS valuations as follows: for each
t ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . ,m} each bidder sends the same message as in At. Now compute logm+1 allocations,
one for each value of t, and output the allocation with the highest value.
We now show the existence of one “good” t as above. Let (O1, . . . On) be some optimal solution.
Put the players into logm bins, where player i is in bin r if 2r > |Oi| ≥ r, for r ∈ {1, 2, 4, . . . ,m}.
Let Nr be the set of players in bin r. Let t = argmaxr Σi∈Nrvi(Oi). For each i let Ai be an arbitrary
subset of Oi of size t if i ∈ Nt and Ai = ∅ otherwise. We have that Σivi(Ai) ≥ Σi∈Ntvi(Oi)2 ≥ Σivi(Oi)4 logm .
In the next two subsections we to design two algorithms for t-restricted instances. We will use the
proposition to claim that these algorithms can be extended with a small loss in the approximation
factor to the general case as well.
5Observe that if player i does not report a valuation for some value of µ ∈ M then the algorithm may assume its
valuation for this µ is 0 for every bundle.
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6.1 A Simultaneous O˜(m
1
3 )-Approximation
We show that simultaneous algorithms can achieve better approximation ratios than those that can
be obtained by sketching the valuations. Specifically, we prove that:
Theorem 6.9 There is a deterministic simultaneous algorithm for combinatorial auctions with
subadditive bidders where each player sends poly(m,n) bits that guarantees an approximation ratio
of O˜(m
1
3 ).
Given Proposition 6.3, we may focus only on designing algorithms for t-restricted instances.
The algorithm for t-restricted instances is simple:
1. Each player reports a maximal set of disjoint bundles Si such that for every bundle S ∈ Si :
|S| = t2 and vi(S) = |S|.
2. For each i, let v′i be the following XOS valuation: v
′
i(S) = maxT∈Si |T ∩ S|.
3. Output (T1, . . . , Tn) – the best allocation
6 with respect to the v′i’s.
Notice that the size of the message that each player sends is poly(m). Furthermore, for each bundle
S and bidder i vi(S) ≥ v′i(S). We will show that the best allocation with respect to the v′i’s provides
a good approximation with respect to the original valuations vi’s. I.e.,
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i v
′
i(Ti)
= O˜(m
1
3 ).
The proof considers three different allocations and shows that each allocation provides a good
approximation for a different regime of parameters.
• The best allocation (with respect to the v′i’s) in which each player receives at most one item.
We show that this provides an O(t) approximation with respect to the vi’s.
• Each player i is allocated the fraction of the bundle T ∈ Si that maximizes |T ∩Ai|. We show
that this allocation guarantees an approximation ratio of O˜(l), for some l related to the li’s.
• The third allocation is constructed randomly (even though our algorithm is deterministic):
each player i chooses at random a bundle Si, and each item j is allocated to some player that
j is in his randomly selected bundle, if such exists. Let n′ be the number of nonempty bundles
in (A1, . . . , An). We show that the expected approximation of this allocation is O˜(n
′/l), for
the same l as above.
More formally:
Lemma 6.10 Let (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation that is guaranteed by the t-restrictness of the
instance. Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be the allocation that the algorithm outputs. Then,
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i vi(Ti)
≤ O˜(m1/3).
Proof: We first show that every player i reports a large fraction of Ai (but the items of Ai might
be split among different reported bundles).
Claim 6.11 For each player i, let Φi = Ai ∩ (∪T∈SiT ). We have that |Φi| ≥ t/2.
6As stated, this algorithm uses polynomial communication but may not run in polynomial time since finding the
optimal solution with explicitly given XOS valuations is NP hard. If one requires polynomial communication and
time, an approximate solution may be computed using any of the known constant ratio approximation algorithms.
The analysis remains essentially the same, with a constant factor loss in the approximation ratio.
21
Proof: Suppose that there exists some player i such that |Φi| < t/2, and let S = Ai − (∪T∈SiT ).
Since |Ai| = t, we have that |S| ≥ t/2. But then the set Si is not maximal, since any subset of the
bundle S of size of t/2 could have been added to it.
Corollary 6.12 Σivi(Φi) ≥ Σiv(Ai)2 .
We now divide the players into logm bins so that player i is in bin r if r > |Si| ≥ r2 . Let the set
of players in bin r be Nr. Observe that there has to be some bin l with Σi∈Nlvi(Φi) ≥ Σivi(Φi)logm .
Denote its size by nl = |Nl| ≤ n′. For the rest of this proof we will only consider the players in Nl;
this will result of a loss of at most log(m) in the approximation factor.
Claim 6.13 (O˜(t)-approximation) Σi∈Nlv
′
i(Ti) ≥ Σivi(Φi)/(t · log(m)).
Proof: We show that there exists an allocation (B1, . . . , Bn), |Bi| ≤ 1 for all i, with Σiv′i(Bi) ≥
2Σivi(Φi)/t. For each player i ∈ Nl, let Bi be the set that contains exactly one item ji from Φi if
Φi 6= ∅ and Bi = ∅ otherwise. Notice that the j′is are distinct, since for every i 6= i′ we have that
Φi ∩ Φi′ = ∅. The lemma follows since v′i({ji}) = 1.
Claim 6.14 (O˜(l)-approximation) Σi∈Nlv
′
i(Ti) ≥ Σivi(Φi)/(l · logm).
Proof: For each player i ∈ Nl, let Bi ⊆ Φi be the bundle of the maximal size such that v′i(Bi) =
|Bi|. Note that |Bi| ≥ |Φi|/l as by construction v′i has at most l clauses and by definition each
item in Φi is contained in one of the |Si| clauses of v′i. Therefore, |Bi| ≥ |Φi|/l. Thus we have that
Σi∈Nlv
′
i(Bi) ≥
Σi∈Nlvi(Φi)
l . The claim follows as we already observed that Σi∈Nlvi(Φi) ≥ Σivi(Φi)logm .
Claim 6.15 (O˜(n′/l)-approximation) Σi∈Nlv
′
i(Ti) ≥ 4nll · Σivi(Φi)log(m) .
Proof: Consider the following experiment. For each player in Nl choose uniformly at random
a bundle to compete on among the bundles in the set Si (recall that l2 ≤ |Si| < l). Now allocate
each item j uniformly at random to one of the players that are competing on bundles that contain
that item j.
There are nl players in this experiment, so there are at most nl potential competitors for each
item. Each player has at least l/2 disjoint potential bundles to compete on, hence the expected
number of competitors on each item is at most 2nl/l. So when player i is competing on a bundle,
the expected competition on each of the items he competes on is 2nl/l+1. Therefore, the expected
contribution of each item that player i is competing on is at least l2nl . The lemma follows by applying
linearity of expectation on the (at least) t/2 items that are in the bundle that player i is competing
on. Therefore we have that Σi∈Nlv
′
i(Ti) ≥ l2nl ·
t
2 ·nl = l·t4 . Recall that Σivi(Φi)log(m) ≤ Σi∈Nlvi(Φi) ≤ t ·nl.
Thus we have that l·t4 ≥ 4nll · Σivi(Φi)log(m) as required.
By choosing the best of these three allocations we get the desired approximation ratio:
Claim 6.16 Suppose that we have three allocations B1, B2 and B3 such that:
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i v
′
i(B
1
i )
= O(t),
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i v
′
i(B
2
i )
= O˜(l) and
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i v
′
i(B
3
i )
= O˜(n′/l). Let B be the allocation with the highest welfare among
the three. Then,
∑
i vi(Ai)∑
i v
′
i(Bi)
= O˜(m
1
3 ).
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Proof: By the first two claims, we get an approximation ratio of O˜(m
1
3 ) whenever l < m
1
3 or
t < m
1
3 . Hence, we now assume that l, t ≥ m 13 . Now observe that when t ≥ m 13 then n′ ≤ m 23 ,
since there can be at most m/t players that receive non-empty (disjoint) bundles in any allocation
where the size of each non-empty bundle is at least t. We therefore have that n
′
l ≤ m
1
3 and the
lemma follows by the third claim.
6.2 A k-Round Algorithm
We now develop an algorithm that guarantees an approximation ratio of O(m
1
k+1 ) for combinatorial
auctions with subadditive valuations in k rounds. In each of the rounds each player sends poly(m)
bits. We provide an algorithm for t-restricted instances (see Section 6.1 for a definition). By
Proposition 6.3 this implies an algorithm with almost the same approximation ratio for general
subadditive valuations.
The Algorithm (for t-restricted instances)
1. Let N1 = N , U1 =M and U1,i =M .
2. In every round r = 1, . . . , k:
(a) Each player reports the a maximal set of disjoint bundles Sr,i such that for every bundle
S ∈ Sr,i : S ⊆ Ur,i, |S| = t2k and vi(S) = |S|.
(b) Go over the players in Nr in an arbitrary order. For every player i for which there exists
a bundle S ∈ Sr,i such that at least 1
m
1
k+1
of its items were not allocated yet, allocate
player i the remaining unallocated items of S.
(c) Let Nr+1 ⊆ Nr be the set of players that were not allocated items at round r or before.
(d) Let Ur+1 ⊆ Ur be the set of items that were not allocated at round r or before.
(e) Let Ur+1,i = (∪S∈Sr,iS) ∩ Ur+1.
Theorem 6.17 For every k ≤ logm, there exists an algorithm for t-restricted instances that pro-
vides an approximation ratio of O(k ·m 1k+1 ) in k rounds where each player sends poly(m,n) bits.
In particular, when k = O(logm) the approximation ratio is O(logm). As a corollary, there exists
a k-round approximation algorithm for subadditive valuations that provides an approximation ratio
of O(k ·m 1k+1 · log3m).
Proof: In the analysis we fix some optimal solution (O1, . . . , On). We break the proof of the
theorem into two lemmas.
Lemma 6.18 At the end of the algorithm, either for every player i that did not receive any bundle
we have that Uk+1,i = ∅, or the approximation ratio of the algorithm is O(m
1
k+1 ).
Proof: Observe the for every player i and round r, if i ∈ Nr ∩ Nr+1 then | ∪S∈Sr,i S| ≥
m
1
k+1 | ∪S∈Sr+1,i S|. This is true since if player i was not allocated any items at round r then for
every bundle S ∈ Sr,i that he reported, at least (1 − 1
m
1
k+1
) of the items were allocated. Thus,
m
1
k+1 ·|Ur+1,i| ≤ |∪S∈Sr,iS|. Recall that by definition we have that (∪S∈Sr+1,iS) ⊆ Ur+1,i. Therefore,
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for every player i that was not allocated anything at round k, we have that |Uk+1,i| ≤ m
1
k+1 . If there
exists a player i such that |Uk+1,i| > 0 then it has to be the case that initially | ∪S∈S1,i S| ≥ m
k
k+1 .
This implies that at least m
k
k+1 −m 1k+1 of the items were allocated and hence the approximation
ratio is O(m
1
k+1 ) (there are m items, so the value of the optimal solution is at most m). In any
other case for every player that was not allocated any bundle we have that Uk+1,i = ∅.
Lemma 6.19 Suppose that for every player i that did not receive any bundle we have that Uk+1,i =
∅. The approximation ratio of the algorithm is O(k ·m 1k+1 ).
Proof: Suppose that at least n′/2 players were allocated non empty bundles. The value of
the bundle that each player was allocated is at least t
2k·m
1
k+1
. Thus, in this case the algorithm
achieves an O(k · m 1k+1 )-approximation (recall that the value of the optimal solution is n′ · t).
Else, assume that at most n′/2 players were allocated some bundle. Consider player i in N ′ that
did not receive any items (there are at least n′/2 such players). We will show that for each such
player i, |Oi ∩ Uk| ≤ t/4. In other words, we will show that for every such player i, the algorithm
allocates at least 3t4 of the items that this player receives in the optimal solution. This will prove
an approximation ratio of O(k ·m 1k+1 ).
Thus assume towards contradiction that there exists some i ∈ N that did not receive any items
for which |Oi∩Uk| ≥ 3t/4. In this case by Claim 6.20 (below) we have that |Oi∩Uk,i| ≥ 3t4 −k· t2k = t4 .
In particular this implies that |Uk,i| ≥ t/4. This is a contradiction to the assertion of Lemma 6.18
that Uk,i = ∅ for every player that was not allocated any bundle.
Claim 6.20 For every i ∈ Nr ∩N ′, |Oi ∩ Ur| − |Oi ∩ (∪S∈Sr,iS)| ≤ r · t2k .
Proof: We prove the claim by induction. For the base case r = 1, observe that since player i
reports a maximal set of bundles of value t2k at most
t
2k items of his optimal bundle may not be
reported by him – otherwise, those items can be bundled together and added to Sr,i, contradicting
maximality. We now assume correctness for r and prove for r + 1. We have that |Oi ∩ Ur| − |Oi ∩
(∪S∈Sr,iS)| ≤ r · t2k . Denote the items allocated at round r by Ar. We have that |Oi ∩ (Ur \Ar)| −
|Oi∩(∪S∈Sr,iS)\Ar| ≤ r · t2k since ∪S∈Sr,iS) ⊆ ur. By definition, this implies that |Oi∩Ur+1|−|Oi∩
ur+1,i)| ≤ r · t2k . The proof is completed by observing that |Oi∩Ur,i|− |Oi∩ (∪S∈Sr,iS)| ≤ t2k . Since
in every round player i reports a maximal disjoint set of bundles of size t2k , thus at every round
the player can leave out of its reported set at most t2k items from the optimal solution (i.e., if the
player leaves out more items then he could have reported those items, contradicting maximality).
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A Communication Complexity of Bipartite Matching
In this appendix we discuss a proposed communication complexity investigation of the bipartite
matching problem. This model is essentially the same as that used in our investigation of bipartite
matching in the rest of the paper but focusing on the exact problem rather than on approximations,
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and proposing the study of communication as of itself rather than merely as an abstraction of market
processes.
We focus on the open problem(s) and shortly mention some related models where communication
bottlenecks for matching have been investigated and give a few pointers to different such threads
where the interested reader may find many more references.
A.1 The Model and Problem
There are n items and n players. Each player i holds a subset Si of items that he is interested in.
I.e. we have a bipartite graph with n left vertices (players) and n right vertices (items), and have
a player in our model for each left vertex, a player that knows the set of neighbors of his vertex in
the bipartite graph (but there are no players associated with the items.) The goal of these players
is to find a maximum matching between items and players, i.e. that each player is assigned a single
item ji ∈ Si with no items assigned to multiple players ji 6= ji′ for i 6= i′.
Communication Model
The players engage in a fixed communication protocol using broadcast messages. Formally they
take turns writing on a common “blackboard”. At every step in the protocol, the identity of the
next player i to write a bit on the blackboard must be completely determined by the contents of
the blackboard, and the message written by this player i must be determined by the contents of the
blackboard as well as his own private input Si. Whether the protocol terminates at a given point
must be completely determined by the contents of the blackboard, and at this point the output
matching must be solely determined by the contents of the blackboard. This model is completely
equivalent to a decision tree, each query can be an arbitrary function depending only on a single
player’s information Si. The measure of complexity here is the total number of bits communicated.
Rounds
The communication model above allows an arbitrary order of communication. Of interest are also
various limited orders: oblivious (the order of speaking is fixed independently of the input), and
the simplest special case of it, one-way communication where the players speak in the fixed order of
player 1, player 2, etc. We will focus on speaking in rounds: in each “round” each of the n players
writes a message on the blackboard, a message that may depend on his own input as well as the
messages of the others in previous rounds (i.e. on the contents of the blackboard after the previous
round). The measures of complexity here are the number of rounds and the total number of bits
communicated. The special case of a single round is called a simultaneous protocol.
Open Problems
How much communication is needed for finding a maximum matching? What if we are limited to
r rounds? These questions apply both to deterministic and to randomized protocols. The tradeoff
between communication and approximation is of course also natural to explore.
What is Known
The trivial upper bound for communication is n2 since players can all simultaneously send their
full input. The trivial lower bound is Ω(n log n) as this is the number of bits necessary to represent
the output matching (and every matching may need to be given as output).
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Significantly, the non-deterministic (and co-non-deterministic) communication complexity is
also O(n log n): to verify that a given matching is maximum size it suffices to add a Hall-theorem
blocking set, or alternatively a solution for the dual. Specifically, a specification of a set of “high-
price” items, so that (1) only allocated items are high-price (2) all players that are not allocated a
low price item are only interested in high-price ones. The fact that the non-deterministic complexity
is low means that “easy” lower bounds techniques such as fooling-sets or cover-size bounds will not
suffice for giving good lower bounds.
Interestingly, an O(n1.5 log n) upper bound can be obtained by adapting known algorithms to
this framework: First, the auction algorithm described in Section 4 gives a (1 − δ)-approximation
using O(n log n/δ) communication. When we choose δ = 1/
√
n this means that we get a matching
that is at most smaller than the optimal one by an additive
√
n. We can thus perform
√
n more
augmenting path calculations to get an optimal matching. Each augmenting path calculation
requires only O(n log n) bits of communication: it requires finding a path in a graph on the players
that has a directed edge between player i and player i′ whenever i is interested in an item that
is currently allocated to i′. The goal here is to find a path from any player that is not allocated
an item to any player that is interested in an unallocated item. A breadth first search with the
blackboard serving as the queue requires writing every vertex at most once on the blackboard, at
most O(n log n) communication.
We do not know any better upper bound, nor do we know a better than O(n2) upper bound
for even n rounds. Our lower bounds for matching provide an Ω(n2) lower bound for simultaneous
protocols, and a n1+Ω(1/ log logn) lower bound for one-way communication follows from [15]. We don’t
know any lower bound better than Ω(n log n) for general protocols or even for 2-round protocols.
Algorithmic Implications
We believe that studying the bipartite matching under this model may be a productive way of
understanding the general algorithmic complexity of the problem. A major open problem is whether
bipartite matching has a (nearly-)linear time algorithm: O(n2+o(1)) time for dense graphs (and
maybe O(m1+o(1)) for graphs with m edges). The best deterministic running time known (for the
dense case) is the 40-year old O(n2.5) algorithm of [18], with a somewhat better randomized O(nω)
algorithm known [29] (where ω = 2.3... is the matrix multiplication exponent). For special cases like
regular or near-regular graphs nearly linear times are known (e.g. [34]). In parallel computation, a
major open problem is whether bipartite matching can be solved in parallel poly-logarithmic time
(with a polynomial amount of processors). Randomized parallel algorithms for the problem [30, 22]
have been known for over 25 years.
On the positive side, it is “likely” that any communication protocol for bipartite matching that
improves on the currently known O(n1.5) complexity will imply a faster than the currently known
O(n2.5) algorithm. This is not a theorem, however the computational complexity needed to send a
single bit in a communication protocol is rarely more than linear in the input held by the player
sending the bit. Most often each bit is given by a very simple computation in which case this is so
trivially, but sometimes, clever data structures will be needed for this to be so. If this will be the
case in the communication protocol in question then the improved algorithm is implied. A similar
phenomena should happen if a deterministic communication protocol that uses poly-logarithmic
many rounds is found since most likely each bit sent by each player is determined by a simple
computation that can be computed in parallel logarithmic time.
On the negative side, lower bounds in a communication model do not imply algorithmic lower
bounds, however they can direct the search for algorithms by highlighting which approaches cannot
work. This is the great strength of concrete models of computation where lower bounds are possible
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to prove.
A.2 Related Models
The bipartite matching problem has been studied in various models that focus on communication.
Point to Point Communication
In our model players communicate using a “blackboard”; any bits sent by a player is seen by all. A
weaker model that is more natural to capture realities in distributed systems will consider the case
where each message is sent to a single recipient. Such models are also called “message passing”
or “private channels”. One must be slightly careful in defining such protocols as to ensure that
no communication is “smuggled” by the timing of messages, and the standard way of doing so is
using the essentially equivalent coordinator model of [11]. It turns out that bipartite matching is
even harder to approximate without broadcast and the results of [19] give an Ω(α2n2) lower bound
for even finding an α-approximation (even using randomization). Note that this model is trivially
more general than that of simultaneous protocols hence this lower bound gives the randomized
lower bound from Theorem 3.2. We also note that our proof for this theorem actually also applies
to the model of interactive protocols with private channels.
Multiple Vertices per Processor
In our model, the problem for n+ n-vertex graphs is handled by n players. A model that is more
appropriate for the current scales of distributed systems is to use k processors where k << n. There
are various options for partitioning the n2 bits of input to the processors where, most generally, each
of the k processors can hold an arbitrary part. This is the usual model of interest for distributed
systems and was e.g. used in [19]. Here again one might distinguish between broadcast and point to
point communication models, where the gap between the models can be no larger than a factor of k.
To convert an auction-based algorithm to run in this framework one must be able to calculate the
demand of a vertex. Usually this can be easily done with O(k log n) communication, but in many
cases it is possible to pay an overhead of O(δ−1) instead. In particular, the basic δ-approximation
auction algorithm that obtains a (1−δ) approximation can be run in this model using O(n log n/δ2)
communication in the blackboard model and thus O(kn log /δ2) with point to point communication.
Two Players
When we are down to k = 2 players we are back to the standard two-player communication
complexity model of Yao. Two variants regarding the partition of the input to the two players are
natural here: (a) each player i holds an arbitrary subset Ei of the edges and the graph in question
is just the union E1 ∪ E2; (b) each player i holds the edges adjacent to n/2 of the left-vertices.
These models are less-distributed and thus stronger than our n-player model. As in our model,
the complexity of bipartite matching is completely open, and in particular the communication
complexity of the decision problem of whether the input graph has a perfect matching is open with
no known non-trivial, ω(n), lower bounds or non-trivial, o(n2) upper bounds.
Streaming and Semi-streaming
One of the main applications of communication complexity is to serve as lower bounds for “stream-
ing” algorithms, those are algorithms that go over the input sequentially in a single pass (or in
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few passes), while using only a modest amount of space. The model of communication complexity
required for such lower bounds is that of a one-way single-round private-channel protocol where in
step i player i sends a message to player i+1. (For r-pass variants of streaming algorithms, we will
have r such rounds of one-way communication.) The lower bounds mentioned above thus imply
that no streaming algorithm that uses o(n) space can get even a constant factor-approximation of
the maximum matching, even with O(1) rounds. A greedy algorithm gets 1/2-approximation in a
single round using O(n) space, and slight improvements in the approximation factor using linear
space are possible, e.g. using the online matching algorithm of [23]. In r passes and nearly-linear
space, [21] gets an 1−O(1/√r) approximation. Streaming algorithms that use linear or near-linear
space are usually called semi-streaming algorithms and lower bounds for them are usually derived
by looking at the information transfer between the “first half” and the “second half” of the input
data and proving a significantly super-linear lower bound on the one-way two-party communication.
This was done in [15] who give a n1+Ω(1/ log logn) lower bound for improving the 2/3 approximation.
To the best of our knowledge no better lower bound is known even for getting an exact maximum
matching.
Distributed Computing
In this model the input graph is also the communication network. I.e. players can communicate
with each other only over links that are edges in the input graph, and the interest is the number of
rounds needed. For this to make sense in a bipartite graph we need to also have processors for the
right-vertices of the graph (and thus every edge is known by the two processors it connects.) It is
not hard to see that to get a perfectly maximal matching in this model transfer of information across
the whole diameter of the graph may be needed, which may require Ω(n) rounds of communication,
but in [28] a protocol is exhibited that gives a (1− δ)-approximation in O(log n/δ3) rounds.
B Gross Substitutes Valuations
Proposition B.1 Any exact simultaneous algorithm for combinatorial auctions with gross substi-
tutes valuations (even for just two players) requires super polynomial message length.
Proof: Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists an exact algorithm A for combinatorial
auctions with gross substitutes where the message length of each message is polynomial. We
will show how given such an algorithm A we can construct an exact sketch any gross substitutes
valuation using only polynomial space. We get a contradiction since gross substitutes valuations
do not admit polynomial sketches [4]. Since the construction of [4] contains only integer-valued
functions between 1 and poly(m) it suffices to show how to sketch these functions only.
Given such an algorithm A the sketch for a valuation v we construct is simply the message Lv
a player with valuation v sends in the algorithm A and in addition the value v(M). We now show
how to compute the value of any bundle v(S) with no additional communication cost. For this it
suffices to show that for any T ⊂M and any item j /∈ T we can compute the marginal value v(j|T ).
To compute the marginal value v(j|T ), we construct the following family of additive valuations:
vj|Tx ({j′}) =


x for j′ = j
0 for j′ ∈ T
2v(M) otherwise
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Consider an instance with two players, one with valuation v and the other with valuation v
j|T
x .
Observe that in any efficient allocation of this instance the player with valuation v should always
receive bundle T . He will also receive item j if v(j|T ) > x and will not receive it if v(j|T ) < x.
Thus, we can use A to compute the value of v(j|T ) > x (with no additional communication cost)
by giving it as an input Lv and Lvj|Tx
for increasing values of x ∈ {12 , 32 , . . . , v(M)− 12}. This allows
to determine the maximal value of x (x∗) for which the v-player receives j. We now have that
v(j|T ) = x∗ + 12 as we assumed that the valuation functions only use integer values.
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